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Abstract— Imitation learning provides a way to automatically
construct a controller by mimicking human behavior from data.
For safety-critical systems such as autonomous vehicles, it can
be problematic to use controllers learned from data because
they cannot be guaranteed to be collision-free. Recently, a
method has been proposed for learning a multi-mode hybrid
automaton cruise controller (MOHA). Besides being accurate,
the logical nature of this model makes it suitable for formal
verification. In this paper, we demonstrate this capability using
the SpaceEx hybrid model checker as follows. After learning, we
translate the automaton model into constraints and equations
required by SpaceEx. We then verify that a pure MOHA
controller is not collision-free. By adding a safety state based
on headway in time, a rule that human drivers should follow
anyway, we do obtain a provably safe cruise control. Moreover,
the safe controller remains more human-like than existing
cruise controllers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adaptive cruise control (ACC) systems assist drivers to
maintain safety spacing from leading vehicles and ease the
workload of frequent acceleration and deceleration opera-
tions. A key drawback of existing ACCs is the inconsistency
between systems and human driving habits, since the control
algorithm of an ACC is based on mathematical optimization
of safety and comfort rather than mimicking actual driving
behaviors [1]. An alternative approach is imitation learning,
which mimics human control strategies in order to obtain
behavior that is similar to the driving trajectories of human
drivers. As a representative work, convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs) have been successfully applied to map raw
pixels from a single front-facing camera directly to steering
commands [2]. Being a safety-critical system, however, it is
very important to know whether an imitation learning cruise
controller is safe to use, i.e., whether it can cause collisions
or not. In [3] such a study is performed. They use simulations
to test the safety properties of controllers based on deep
neural networks. We argue, however, that since unexpected
situations will at some point occur in practice, testing these
properties in simulations is insufficient.
Recently, an imitation-learning-based model named multi-
mode hybrid automaton (MOHA) has been proposed to
mimic car-following behaviors of human drivers [4]. This
model includes both discrete observations and continuous
output actions. The observations are obtained by discretizing
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signal values such as speed and distance to the leading
vehicle. The output controls the acceleration pedal of the
following vehicle.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the logical nature of
MOHA controller allows it to be formally verified using the
SpaceEx hybrid system model checker [5]. This was recently
achieved for a simplified traditional (not learned) ACC in [6].
The main idea of our work is to use SpaceEx to verify
whether collisions are avoided by MOHA when given a non-
deterministic leading vehicle. The leading vehicle is only
constrained by vehicle dynamics, e.g., it can produce any
trajectory falling within physically possible speed and accel-
eration ranges. To achieve this, we develop a transformation
MO2SX from the discrete observations, which trigger state
transitions in MOHA to a set of linear inequalities that can
be used by SpaceEx. The transformation is exact without
approximation error. In addition, we enhance MOHA to
include actions for any possible future action, including those
that never occurred in the training data but might be tested
by the model checker.
We perform experiments in a variety of traffic for both
highway and urban driving scenarios. The experiments
demonstrate that purely learning a MOHA controller from
data is unsafe, e.g., that it can collide in extreme cases. We
then add a safety state to MOHA (a common addition to
ACC systems). Essentially, the controller is forced to push
the brake if the time needed to reach the current position of
the leading vehicle drops below, for instance, two seconds
suggested in the highway driving scenarios. We show that:
• MOHA controller with safety state is guaranteed to be
collision-free.
• MOHA is more safe, more accurate, and more human-
like than existing controllers and neural networks.
These results demonstrate clear advantages of using explain-
able models based on logic (such as MOHA) over black-box
models (such as neural nets) for imitation learning. Instead
of trusting an AI-based controller based on simulations, our
work demonstrates the possibility to verify with certainty
whether an AI-based controller is safe.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows.
Related work is reviewed in Section II. MOHA and its
learning algorithm are introduced in Section III. The model
transformation for hybrid model checker is explained in
Section IV. The experimental results are discussed in Section
V. Our conclusions are in Section VI.
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II. RELATED WORK
Verifying the safety of hybrid models is known to be
undecidable except for severely restricted models such as
timed automata and initialized rectangular automata [7].
There exist three categories of techniques/tools that address
relaxed versions of this problem.
The first category is deductive verification, which com-
bines user interaction with an automated theorem prover in a
proof search utilizing differential logics [8]. KeYmaera is the
dominant tool in this category, and has been used for safety
verification of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication in
ACCs [8].
The second category is symbolic reachability analysis,
which includes tools such as HyTech [9] for linear hy-
brid automata, d/dt [10], PHAVER [11], SpaceEx [5] for
piecewise linear affine dynamics, and Flow* [12] for non-
linear dynamics. In these techniques, symbolic reachability
algorithms iteratively explore reachable states starting from
the initial states. There is no termination guarantee because
the algorithm may reach more and more states without being
able to conclude that the system is safe. In practice, setting a
maximum number of states, a fixed-point reaching criterion,
or a maximum running time is used to force termination. In
very related work, a highly simplified ACC with constant
acceleration and deceleration in an open loop control system
is verified using symbolic reachability analysis in SpaceEx
[6].
The third category is called abstraction. The main idea is
obtaining an abstraction of coarse dynamics over the original
model. Proving the safety of the abstract model then is a
sufficient condition for proving the corresponding properties
in the original model [13]. The drawback is that it can be
difficult to avoid an oversimplification.
In this work, we use symbolic reachability analysis using
SpaceEx, similar to the work of [6] but using a complex
model that has been learned from data.
Also related are recent works on generating test cases
for neural networks. Deep neural networks are a popular
method for learning dynamics such as those in ACCs.
DeepXplore [14] and DeepTest [3] propose white-box and
gray-box methods for automated generation of test cases
and discovering the corner cases from deep neural networks
(DNN). However, they focus more on software logic testing
using a coverage criterion. This type of testing is incomplete
and does not perform a full reachability analysis. Recently,
researchers make progress on verifying safety of deep neural
network-based controllers using reachability analysis tech-
niques. Feedforward neural networks with piecewise linear
ReLUs activation functions are demonstrated to be verifiable
[15], [16]. More complex deep neural net with sigmoid
activation functions are also verified [17]. However, the
architecture of these neural network is limited to feedfarward
one. In addition, verifying these NN-based controllers is es-
sentially in a non-dynamical fashion, i.e., statically verifying
input-output properties at each time step. Our work is dealing
with a dynamical verification problem: given a sequence
of environment observations and control actions, we verify
whether the safety property is guaranteed. Indeed, combining
reachable states from multiple steps can achieve a sequential
verification results, however, we will suffer from large over-
approximation error and high computation cost problems.
III. MOHA: AN HYBRID AUTOMATON MODEL
Definition III.1. Hybrid automaton: A hybrid automaton
H is a tuple < Loc,Edge,Σ,X, Init, Inv,Flow, Jump >
where:
• Loc is a finite set {l1, l2, · · · , lm} of (control) locations
that represent control modes of the hybrid system, which are
essentially discrete states in a finite state automaton.
• Σ is a finite set of events.
• Edge ⊆ Loc × Σ × Loc is a finite set of labeled edges
representing discrete changes of control modes in the hybrid
system. Those changes are labeled by events from Σ.
• X is a finite set {x1, x2, · · · , xn} of n-dimension real-
valued variables. For example, in a standard ACC system,
the variables at least include the position of the leading and
following vehicles xl and xf , and their speeds vl and vf . X˙ is
for the first-order differential of variables {x˙1, x˙2, · · · , x˙m}
inside a location. The primed variables {x′1, x′2, · · · , x′n} are
used to represent updates of variables from one control mode
to another, called an assignment.
• Init(l) is a predicate for the valuation of free variables
from X when the hybrid system starts from location l.
• Inv(l) is a predicate whose free variables are from X.
It constrains the possible valuations for those variables
when the control of the hybrid system is in location l. A
commonly used convex predicate is a finite conjunction of
linear inequalities, e.g. x1 ≥ 3 ∧ 3x2 ≤ x3 + 5/2., which
represents a polytope consisting of multiple half-spaces.
• Flow(l) is a predicate whose free variables are from X∪X˙ .
It defines a continuous system evolution for when the control
mode is in location l using a differential equation (usually
ordinary differential equation, ODE).
• Jump is a function that assigns to each labeled edge a
predicate whose free variables are from X ∪ X˙ . Jump(e)
states when the discrete change modeled by the event e is
possible and what the variable updates are when the hybrid
system makes this discrete change.
MOHA is a novel model for learning car-following be-
haviors using a hybrid automaton recently proposed in [4].
The main idea of learning MOHA for continuous time series
data is illustrated in the flowchart shown in Fig. 1.
First, continuous variables from time series are discretized
into sequences of symbolic events. Each sequence is a com-
plete car-following trajectory from a pair consisting of a lead-
ing vehicle and a following vehicle. The time gap between
two consecutive events is encoded in order to represent time-
varing behaviors, e.g., moderate/harsh braking. In this way,
we obtain timed strings {(ei1, ti1), · · · (eij , tij), · · · , (ein, tin)}
from the i-th trajectory, where tij is the time difference
between discrete events eij and e
i
j−1.
Second, as a model for the discrete dynamics, a timed
automaton is learned using the RTI+ real-time identification
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Fig. 1: Flowchart illustrating MOHA learning. The discretization
on a one-dimension signal is just for a simple demonstration. The
original signal is multidimensional. Also, MOHA shows more than
3 modes in car-following behaviors [4].
algorithm [18]. The original continuous values used to obtain
the corresponding discretized values in the timed string are
stored in every state.
Third, states are partitioned based on a state subsequence
clustering, i.e., several states in a subsequence cluster are
grouped into one block in the automaton. These blocks form
the different control modes of the ACC system.
Last, numeric data reached in distinct modes are used
to identify the parameters of differential equations in these
modes using differential evolution algorithms (DEA).
The environmental input in MOHA is 3-dimensional, i.e.,
the relative speed, the relative distance, and the following
vehicle’s speed. Changes to these variables may trigger
discrete state and control mode transitions. After entering
a new mode, the controller uses the corresponding differen-
tial equation to generate continuous acceleration/deceleration
output.
These equations are linear Helly models [19]. The ac-
celeration in Helly’s model is a linear function combining
the relative speed (∆v = vl − vf ) and the relative distance
between the headway (∆x = xl − xf ) and the desired
headway, which is defined by :
v˙f (t) = C1 ·∆v(t) + C2 · (∆x(t)−D(t)) (1)
and
D(t) = α+ β · vf (t) (2)
where C1, C2, α, β, are the constant parameters that need to
be calibrated. The desired headway is a function of the speed
of the following vehicle and a safety distance, where α, β and
are the corresponding weightings for those variables. Note
that, compared with the original Helly model, we neglect
time delays because the SpaceEx model checker does not
support tracking long historical variables, so all computations
are on-the-fly.
IV. HYBRID MODEL CHECKER
Hybrid model verification based on reachability computa-
tion is similar in spirit to numerical simulation, which pro-
duces all possible trajectories one by one to check whether
the system behaves properly. The obvious drawback is the
fact that all possible trajectories are non-enumerable, though
it has been a popular “verification” approach in several
ACC design works [20]. The reachability algorithm explores
the state space in a breadth-first manner, that is, at each
time step all the states reachable by all possible one-step
inputs from states reachable in the previous step. Though
the computation is costly, it provides more confidence in the
correctness of the system than a small number of individual
simulated trajectories. In the hybrid verification problem, an
over-approximation is used for the set of reachable states, and
a conventional symbolic state reachability algorithm is used.
By checking whether forbidden states such as collisions are
reachable, the model can be guaranteed to be safe.
A. SpaceEx
SpaceEx is a powerful and popular tool for safety veri-
fication of hybrid systems. It supports hybrid systems with
linear piecewise affine and non-deterministic dynamics, i.e.,
X˙ = AX + b, where b is non-deterministic turbulence.
SpaceEx consists of three main components: Model editor
is a graphical editor for creating models of complex hybrid
systems. Analysis core is a command line program that takes
a model file in .xml format, and a configuration file .cfg that
specifies the initial states. Web interface is a graphical user
interface with which one can specify initial states and other
analysis parameters, run the analysis core, and visualize the
output.
B. Translator
Though SpaceEx is becoming a user-friendly tool, the
modeling is still manual. If the model under verification is
complex, an automated modelling tool is needed to bypass
the tedious modeling process. In our case, we intend to
verify a MOHA model, consisting of a timed automaton
model, parameters of continuous models in modes, and a
discretization of continuous signals into discrete symbols.
The translator developed in this paper, MO2SX, fills the gap
between MOHA and SpaceEX. Users only need to work on
learning and tuning parameters of MOHA, and the output
model is automatically translated to SpaceEX for safety ver-
ification. The input and output files of MO2SX are illustrated
in Fig. 2. MO2SX automatically obtains a SpaceEx model
file with 1500 lines of code, which is burdensome for manual
modeling.
Guard linearization and model completing are two critical
problems we need to address in the translating procedure,
and are elaborated below.
1) Guard linearization: In MOHA, the numeric envi-
ronmental input is discretized into discrete event symbols
according to the closest centroids in the 2-norm, i.e., Si =
{xp : ||xp−mi||2 ≤ ||xp−mj ||2,∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, where Si is
the assigned index of the centroid (symbol), xp the numeric
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Fig. 2: Translator MO2SX. The files on the left side is from MOHA
and the initial setting. The files on the right side are supported for
model checking in SpaceEx.
Fig. 3: Polyhedra obtained by Voronoi diagram linearization. Dis-
crete events are illustrated by different colors.
data, mi,mj centroids, and k the number of centroids. The
centroids are learned using the k-means clustering algorithm
and used to trigger state transitions. This representation
is non-linear and not supported by existing hybrid model
checkers. To circumvent this issue, we translate the clusters
to a bounded three-dimensional Voronoi Diagram [21]. The
main idea is to partition a bounded 3-d space into regions
(polyhedra, the number of which is equal to the number of
centroids), that are represented by linear inequalities. In each
solid polyhedron, all points are closest to its the polyhedron’s
centroid. Each polyhedron is consists of several hyperplanes,
i.e., a conjunction of linear inequalities, as illustrated in Fig.
3. Note that MOHA shown in [4] has 10 discrete events from
“a” to “j”, which are essentially symbolic representations
from k-means clustering on continuous data. Therefore, 10
polyhedra are obtained by the Voronoi diagram. Note that
such a linearization is an exact transformation without any
approximation error.
2) Model Generalization: Due to the limited traffic sce-
narios in the training data, the learned automaton model is
incomplete and does not contain a transition for every pos-
sible situation. We complete the model by adding transitions
for unsee events and directing them to the initial state. Taking
S1 as an example as shown in Fig. 4, the added symbols are
the neighboring polyhedra of existing events “d” and “c”. We
obtain these by searching for adjacent polyhedra as illustrated
in Fig 3. We only require neighboring polyhedra because we
assume that trajectories cannot jump between nonadjacent
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Fig. 4: An illustrative example of completing outgoing transitions
in S1 of MOHA.
polyhedra (essentially skipping an event). We redirect new
transitions to the initial state because this implements a type
of recovering behavior: when the controller has no idea about
what to do next (something unexpected occurs), it makes no
assumptions about the past (by returning to the initial state),
and assumes any future is possible.
V. MODELING AND EXPERIMENTS
Our experimental framework (shown in Fig. 5) consists
of two components running in parallel: a nondeterministic
leading vehicle with constraints about speed and acceleration
and a following vehicle equipped with a cruise controller. The
autobrake state is used for handling automatic brake scenar-
ios when the relative distance is small. We will compare the
safety performances with and without this state. In this paper,
the leading vehicles running in highway and urban traffic are
studied:
• Highway: We adopt the general legitimate range on the
highway: 80-120 km/h (see all settings shown in Tab.
I). The leading vehicle runs nondeterministically, which
means the leading vehicle is not governed by any con-
troller. The free running of the leading vehicle’s is only
subject to rough physical constraints, e.g., minimum
and maximum bounds of speed, acceleration, etc. The
speed range is the working condition of a standard ACC
system [22].
• Urban: We adopt the general legitimate range in cities:
10-80 km/h (see all settings shown in Tab. I). The
leading vehicle runs nondeterministically. Such a new
scenario is for testing the generalization of the model,
because the training data of MOHA are from highway
traffic.
We evaluate three different control strategies:
• Pure MOHA (P-MOHA): A MOHA purely controls
the following vehicle without an additional emergency
brake state. We will investigate if the Pure-MOHA
learned from human car-following behaviors is already
safe for cruise control. MOHA with single mode and
TABLE I: Parameter settings in highway scenarios (top) and urban
scenarios (bottom)
Parameters values Parameters values
vl min (m/s) 22 vl max (m/s) 33
vf min (m/s) 0 vf max (m/s) 33
xl0 (m) 150 vl0 (m/s) [22,33]
af max (m/s2) 6 af min, al min (m/s2) -4
al max (m/s2) 0 vf0 (m/s) [22,33]
vl min (m/s) 3 vl max (m/s) 22
vf min (m/s) 0 vf max (m/s) 22
xl0 (m) 150 vl0 (m/s) [3,22]
af max (m/s2) 6 af min, al min (m/s2) -4
al max (m/s2) 0 vf0 (m/s) [3,22]
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Fig. 5: Modelling overview of the experiments.
multiple modes is called S-MOHA and M-MOHA for
short, respectively.
• Autobrake state on basis of braking distance+MOHA
(BD-MOHA): In existing ACCs, a warning notifies
the driver to take over or (semi-)automatically switches
to a braking state when the relative distance is too
short. In this work, a safety state is added to the data-
driven P-MOHA to deal with emergency and automatic
braking scenarios. The trigger condition of the braking
state is that the relative distance ∆x is smaller than
the braking distance v·vmax2∗amin . Note that theoretically
the braking distance is
v2f
2∗amin . Due to the limited
support functionality of linear equations of SpaceEx,
the simplified condition is used instead.
• Autobrake state on basis of headway-in-time+MOHA
(HIT-MOHA): The headway-in-time (HIT) is usually
suggested in daily highway driving scenarios. The fol-
lower’s desired distance is set to vf × theadway for
a given theadway , i.e., the relative distance should
be greater the distance the follower would travel in
theadway without reducing speed.
Another motivation for setting an autobrake state is from
the theoretical analysis of the minimum deceleration in the
Helly model. We take the single mode identified from the
natural data with C1 = 0.0425, C2 = 0.0051, α = 22.37,
and β = 0.1. In the worst case, ∆v = −33 m/s, vf = 33 m/s.
The full deceleration derived from Equation 1 and Equation
2 is −1.68 m/s2, which is significantly less powerful than
the the full deceleration −4 m/s2 used in this paper.
MOHA is compared with two baseline models in this
paper. The first one is a random follower. A random follower
with nondeterministic dynamics is an over-approximation
over any controller. The proportional–integral–derivative
(PID) controller is commonly used in existing ACC systems
[23]. Due to the limited functionalities of SpaceEx, the
model checker does not allow access to long-term historical
variables which are needed for the derivative part of PID.
Instead, we use an auxiliary automaton as a one-step-past
memory storage, and the PD controller is implemented and
serves as the second baseline with the form: ddes(i) = dsafe + vf (i)err = dx(i)− ddes(i)
apid(i) = kp ∗ err(i) + kd ∗ (err(i)− err(i− 1))
(3)
The parameters are well-tuned on the NGSIM dataset as
Kp = 0.8, Kd = 0.03, dsafe = 20m [4].
The parameters of vehicle dynamics are also presented in
Tab. I. These settings are used in the literature [24]. In both
cases, the following vehicle starts tracking at the maximum
relative distance detectable by the ACC radar system, i.e.,
150 m. The initial states in both cases are uncertain but
bounded by reasonable intervals.
An example of the reachability results in the highway
scenarios of the single mode HIT-MOHA is shown in Fig.
6. Tab. II summarizes the safety for all models and control
strategies. It can be observed that the safety state boosts the
safety of the controllers. The pure MOHA is not guaranteed
to be safe unfortunately.
However, introducing the extra safety state potentially
sacrifices the similarity to human car-following behavior.
The imitation accuracy, or less formally human likeness, is
evaluated using a test set from the NGSIM dataset. The main
idea is that for each car-following episode, the trajectory of
the leading vehicle and the initial status of the following
vehicle are provided. The complete trajectory of the fol-
lowing vehicle is generated using controllers and compared
with the human drivers’ trajectories present in the testing
data. A small trajectory difference indicates a better human-
likeness score. The results are presented in Tab. III. The
score is the mean square error between simulated trajectories
and those of human drivers. A feed-forward neural network
(FNN) is additionally compared as a baseline of imitation
learning with default settings [25], [26]. Note that generating
whole trajectories is essentially an iterative procedure, i.e.,
the trajectory at t+ 1 relies on the result at t. An additional
one-step prediction is shown in Tab. IV to demonstrate the
actual predictive performance of the learned models. The
difference between the results in Tab. III and Tab. IV can
be seen as the difference between multi-step prediction and
one-step prediction.
From the results, we make the following observations:
(a) Reachable states of xl (m) v.s. t (s) (b) Reachable states of xf (m) v.s. t (s) (c) Reachable states xl (m) vs. xf (m)
Fig. 6: Reachable states of single mode HIT-MOHA in the highway scenario. xl and xf are position variables for the leading vehicle and
the following vehicle. It can be observed that at around 5 second, the autobrake state is triggered (see the linearly deceleration in subfig
(b). After 7 second, the relative speed vl − vf > 0), collision is not possible. The model checker verifies that at any state xl > xf (cf.
subfig (c)).
TABLE II: Safety summary of all models.
Scenarios Model Condition Safe?
Highway
P-MOHA - ×
S-MOHA HIT
√
M-MOHA HIT
√
Random HIT
√
PD HIT
√
All above BD
√
Urban
P-MOHA - ×
S-MOHA HIT
√
M-MOHA HIT
√
Random HIT
√
PD HIT
√
All above BD
√
TABLE III: Human likeness score comparison-multi steps
Model Error (m/s) Jerk (m/s3)
Without safety state
M-MOHA 0.1083 0.0037
S-MOHA 0.1124 0.0029
PD 0.1387 0.0438
FNN 0.3451 0.0047
Human - 0.0574
With safety state
M-MOHA 0.1037 0.0373
S-MOHA 0.1089 0.0323
PD 0.1391 0.0380
FNN 0.2411 0.0359
Human - 0.0574
1) The safety is not guaranteed when learning a Pure-
MOHA controller. This makes sense because the train-
ing data do not contain (near) collisions.
2) Switching to an autobrake state boosts the safety of
ACC systems such as MOHA. Among all control strate-
gies, the headway control (HIT) is sufficient and is
suggested by us for normal driving scenarios owing to
its superior balance between safety and human likeness.
3) The BD is the most conservative control strategy, even
though it guarantees full-speed-range scenarios. It is not
recommended because the significant large desired rel-
ative distance leads to poor car-following performance
and traffic jams.
TABLE IV: Human likeness score comparison-one step
Model Error (m/s) jerk (m/s3)
Without safety state
M-MOHA 0.0316 0.0033
S-MOHA 0.0317 0.0025
PD 0.0543 0.0336
FNN 0.0408 0.0048
With safety state
M-MOHA 0.0329 0.0199
S-MOHA 0.0329 0.0195
PD 0.0488 0.0395
FNN 0.0423 0.0469
4) Though introducing the safety state slightly deteriorates
the car-following performance in one-step prediction,
the general performance in whole trajectory control is
not jeopardized.
5) MOHA outperforms both the PD and the FNN baselines
on human likeness, even when it includes a safety state.
There is a significant jump in terms of jerk (sudden
braking) when the safety state is triggered.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a framework to automatically learn and
verify a hybrid automaton-based adaptive cruise controller is
proposed. The framework consists of a learning-component
MOHA and a translator MO2SX. MOHA shows a superior
performance to human-like car-following, while MO2SX au-
tomatically translates MOHA for verification by the SpaceEx
hybrid model checker. We demonstrate that a MOHA model
learned purely from human driving data is not guaranteed to
be safe (collision-free) due to the lack of emergency brake
scenarios in training data. Introducing an additional safety
state guarantees this safety while maintaining good human
likeness scores. To the best of our knowledge, we present the
first formally verified cruise control system that is learned
from data.
In the near future, we will investigate more driving behav-
iors learning and verification, e.g., steering control. Another
interesting research line is using the model checker as an
oracle providing unsafe counterexamples to improve the
model learning part.
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